Suchergebnisse

This article examines how the long-serving Croatian communist leader Vladimir Bakarić conceptualized the Croatian self-managing nation from a set of ideas that involved decentralization, the depoliticization of national identity, and the forging of a classless self-managing nation. As the centralism of the 1950s, originally envisioned to serve the progress of socialism, eventually brought about the gradual rise of inter-national antagonisms between republics in Yugoslavia, Bakarić assumed that empowering the authorities of the republics and the autonomous provinces should serve as the necessary precondition to prevent national identity from being the source of any potential future conflicts. Subsequently, Bakarić conceptualized decentralization as a means that would eventually lead to the depoliticization of national identity, which was necessary to unleash the building of a classless self-management society accompanied by the withering away of state. This article will show how Bakarić's concept of the nation suffered from two serious shortcomings. The first one stemmed from the 1960 purge of socialist Yugoslavism of any notion of ethnicity, since any idea of Yugoslav ethnic identity had been linked to the Greater-Serbian legacy of the pre-war Yugoslav Royal Dictatorship. The second one stemmed from the fact that ethnic nationalism was latently maintained by the deployment of historical narratives of the communists as the heirs of the true national traditions and the best guardians of the national interest.

U članku se prikazuje kritika hrvatske političke emigracije od njezina sudionika
Bogdana Radice. Polazeći od koncepta bijede malih istočnoeuropskih država
poznatoga mađarskog povjesničara Istvána Bibόa, članak pokazuje kako je Radica
bijedu (dijela) hrvatske političke emigracije detektirao u njezinu odbijanju
integraciji u društva zapadne Europe i SAD-a zbog odbacivanja vrijednosti liberalne
demokracije, stoga je emigracija, prema Radici, propustila ispuniti najvažnije zadaće:
pokušati djelovati na javnost i društvene elite zapadnih zemalja u smjeru ostvarenja
samostalne Hrvatske. Naposljetku, Radica analizira fenomen terorizma najmlađega
emigrantskog vala 1970-ih godina preko koncepta dinarskog poluinteligenta
izvedenog iz koncepta poluinteligencije Jósea Ortege Y Gasseta, kojim se Radica već
koristio u opisivanju situacije u Hrvatskoj i Jugoslaviji 1945. godine.

Most scholarship on post-Communist Croatia claims that the first Croatian president, Franjo Tuđman, intentionally rehabilitated the legacy of the World War II (WWII) Croatian Ustaša and its Nazi-puppet state. The rehabilitation of the Ustaša has been linked to Tuđman's national reconciliation politics that tended toward a particular "forgetting of the past." The national reconciliation was conceptualized as a joint struggle of both the Croatian anti-fascist Partisan and the Croatian WWII fascist Ustaša successors to achieve Croatian independence. However, the existing scholarship does not offer a comprehensive explanation of the nexus between national reconciliation and the rehabilitation of the Ustaša. Hence, this article will present how "Ustaša-nostalgia" does not stem from Tuđman's intentions, but rather from the morphological gap occurring in Tuđman's nation-building idea. Namely, Tuđman's condemnation of the entire idea of Yugoslavism and Yugoslavia eventually brought about the perception that any historical agent advocating the idea of an independent Croatia is better than any form of Croatian Yugoslavism. Finally, the article will present how contemporary Croatian society is still seeped in "Ustaša-nostalgia" due to the hesitation of the post-Tuđman Croatian politics to come to terms with the legacy of his national reconciliation politics.

Detecting the gap in the existing literature of Franjo Tuđman's political thought, this article comprehensively analyzes Tuđman's nationalist ideology prior to the 1990s. Using a morphological approach to ideology, the article presents three main clusters of concepts regarding Tuđman's ideology: the narrative on the nature of humankind as teleological struggle to achieve independent national states; the narrative of supranational ideologies – such as liberalism and communism – acting as a pure geopolitical means used by the great nations to subjugate small ones; and finally the narrative of the Croatian thousand-year long struggle to achieve an independent national state. Moreover, the article exposes how Tuđman already by the 1970s created the idea of an all-embracing national movement grounded in the synthesis of abovementioned teleological concept on Croatian history, which would eventually bring about a national reconciliation of Ustaša and the Croatian partisans in a final struggle for the independent state.

We examine the 1914-1918 creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as a form of the ultimatum game. The negotiations among the Serbian Cabinet and the yugoslav Committee representatives of the Habsburg Souths Slavs from 1914-1918 exemplify three versions of this game. The first version is a typical (rational choice) type of the ultimatum game in which the receiver is satisfied with any offer by the Proposer. The second version is an instance of behavioral game theory. When the Proposer gives an unfair offer, it provokes an emotional reaction in the receiver who will reject it at the cost of harming themselves. We observe this behavior in the emotional behavior of frano Supilo, a Croat and one of the leaders of the yugoslav Committee. The third version of the behavioral ultimatum game can be observed in the behavior of Serbian Prime minister nikola Pašić who opposed any concessions to the yugoslav Committee, thus giving an ultimatum to the Croat side to accept the Serbian offer or remain with nothing, which was harmful to the Serbian side, too. This example is important because it produces two conclusions. first, historical games are often a mixture of several versions. Second, Proposers, too, can have an emotional reaction and give an offer that can hurt themselves. This aspect of the ultimatum game is less mentioned because it is difficult to simulate in experiments.

U članku se uspoređuju politike povijesti Drugoga svjetskog rata u Estoniji i Hrvatskoj poslije državnog osamostaljenja. Pokazujući kako su estonski i hrvatski nacionalno-integracijski procesi dominantno bili obilježeni "potragom" za samostalnom državom, temeljna je teza članka da revizionističko sjećanje na estonske i hrvatske osovinske borce kao na "borce za naciju i državu" opstaje zbog isključivog shvaćanja Sovjetskog Saveza i Jugoslavije kao velikoruske odnosno velikosrpske "tamnice" estonskoga i hrvatskog naroda. Iako službeno sjećanje u objema zemljama ističe europsko antifašističko nasljeđe, oklijevanje vlasti u odmicanju od ekskluzivističkih državotvornih politika povijesti potiče pozitivnu interpretaciju estonskoga i hrvatskog fašizma. Autori zaključno prikazuju razlike među dvjema zemljama te upućuju na pogubnost aktualnih europskih politika spram totalitarizma kao obrasca suočavanja s Drugim svjetskim ratom, a koje Estoniju i Hrvatsku još više udaljuju od suočavanja s prošlošću. ; This article offers a comparison of the politics of history of WWII in Estonia and in Croatia after their independence. Following an introduction demonstrating how Estonian and Croatian national integrative processes were predominantly marked by their "pursuit" of independency, the main thesis is exposed – that the revisionist memory of Estonian and Croatian Axis fighters as "fighters for the nation and the state" has survived primarily due to the exclusivist understanding of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia as the Greater-Russian or Greater-Serbian "dungeons" of Estonian and Croatian people, respectively. Although the official historical memory in both countries highlights the European anti-fascist heritage, the authorities' reluctance to move away from the exclusive statehood politics of history serves to promote a positive interpretation of Estonian and Croatian fascism. The authors in conclusion depict the differences between the two countries and warn of the fatal consequences of the current European policies towards totalitarianism as a pattern for dealing with World War II, which are pushing Estonia and Croatia further away from facing the past.

This article focuses on the intention of Youth Labor Actions in former Yugoslavia ‎and the European Solidarity Corps in the EU to contribute to the creation ‎of a Yugoslav and European supranational identity respectively. It does‎ so by analyzing the programs' evolution, ideological underpinnings, but also ‎implementation modalities. The article argues that both programs, despite being‎ developed in different historical periods, nurtured a similar spirit of solidarity‎ and the idea of work for the common good. Both have had a comparable ‎tendency to create and maintain supranational identities in subtle, but at ‎the same time formalized ways. While following the same principal idea, they‎ differ in the context in which they emerged, their treatment of national identities‎ and the type of ideological baggage they carried. Creation of Yugoslavs‎ ultimately failed, while creation of Europeans is still pending, aggravated by ‎EU's poly-crisis, politicization of European integration and clashing conceptions ‎of identity within the EU.‎